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Abst rac t .  A model of the U.S. automobile market is used to test the role that 
natural gas vehicles (NGVs) might play in reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. 
Since natural gas (primarily methane) emits less CO 2 per unit of energy than 
petroleum products, NGVs are an obvious pathway to lower CO2 emissions. 
High- and low-demand scenarios are used to forecast he emissions from un- 
restricted growth and a modest program of conservation, respectively. Based on 
these scenarios, a reference scenario is developed that projects a possible future 
path of automobile use and efficiency. It is found that without a dramatic increase 
in automobile use, fuel consumption and greenhouse-gas emissions from 
automobiles in the United States will probably decrease in the future, provided 
that efficiency continues to improve at modest rates. In theory, NGVs can help 
shift emissions even further down. 
A second objective is to quantify the role that leaking methane might play in 
offsetting some of the greenhouse advantages of NGVs. To do this, a simple 
atmospheric chemistry model is applied to the reference scenario; several eak 
rates and feedback factors are used to test the sensitivity of the projected green- 
house forcing from now until 2050. Committed warming beyond 2050 is not 
included, and the results hould be interpreted with that in mind. 
It is highly unlikely that switching automobiles from gasoline to natural gas will 
appreciably lower future greenhouse forcing. Constraints on vehicle miles trav- 
elled as well as continued improvements in vehicle efficiency will make a much 
larger contribution towards controlling lobal warming. 
Introduction 
Recent concern over the greenhouse ffect has focused attention on opportunities 
to decrease missions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as CO 2 and CH 4 (natural 
gas, methane) and reduce theorized global warming. Switching to natural gas- 
fueled systems is one option because coal and petroleum fuels emit about 75% and 
40% more CO2, respectively, than natural gas. 1 Further, natural gas technologies 
are typically more fuel efficient than their oil- and coal-based counterparts. Pub- 
lished reports, 2 Congressional testimony, 3 editorials, 4 and recent bills 5 all 
acknowledge the role that natural gas might play in a plan to cut U.S. GHG emis- 
sions. Currently, large CO2 savings are realized through natural gas use instead of 
oil or coal in space heating, industrial processing, and electricity production. 6
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Ausubel et al. have argued that these savings will increase as natural gas becomes 
the dominant fuel source in a 'methane economy'.7 
Natural gas-fueled vehicles (NGVs) have been explored as one such methane- 
based technology. In the past, NGVs have been considered for local environmental, 
economic and energy security reasons,  but now NGVs are also considered under a 
broad program of fuel switching to reduce GHG emissions? Certainly other 
automotive technologies - such as hydrogen-fueled and electric vehicles - offer 
greater promise as long-term greenhouse-reduction measures, but NGVs may exist 
as a bridge to those new technologies. Also, there are many environmental reasons 
- aside from the greenhouse effect - why NGVs might become a dominant trans- 
portation system since NGVs emit lower amounts of some pollutants than do their 
conventional gasoline-powered counterparts. Thus one can imagine a number of 
persuasive arguments why natural gas - and NGVs in particular - will become 
more widely used. Given that the greenhouse effect will likely be a significant con- 
cern for energy policy in the future, this paper examines the role NGVs might play 
in reducing reenhouse-gas emissions. 
The paper is divided into two sections. The first section develops amodel of U.S. 
automobile use and applies a number of NGV switching scenarios to explore the 
opportunities for greenhouse-gas reductions. For tl~s section, it is assumed that the 
natural gas recovery and supply system does not leak. The second section ad- 
dresses the effect of methane l aks using the reference scenario developed in the 
first section. Methane is a strong greenhouse gas, so even small leaks might be 
serious greenhouse contributors. Others have argued that the greenhouse benefits 
of NGVs are robust 1~ - that the CO 2 advantages of using NGVs more than out- 
weigh the disadvantages of methane l aks - and one objective of this paper is to 
challenge those results. 
1. The Model 
The model is structured to project changes in vehicle miles travelled (VMT) and 
NGV penetration i to the market. Efficiency projections are then included and 
total fuel use is calculated; greenhouse-gas emissions are computed from total fuel 
consumption and the fuel type. In an effort o put the discussion i  perspective, his- 
torical trends in all variables have been collected back to 1950.1~ The model only 
includes automobiles although opportunities for NGV switching also exist for 
trucks and buses. The observations presented here for cars probably also apply to 
other vehicles. The structure is summarized in Figure 1; below, the variables are 
systematically discussed. 
1.1. Market Growth 
Two scenarios are used for growth of the automobile market; one represents a high 
energy demand and the other low energy demand that is the result of a modest 
program of constraining market growth. A reference scenario - between the high- 
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Fig. 1. Structure of the model. Methane feedbacks shown with double arrows. 
and low-demand scenarios - is developed as one possible future course of U.S. 
automobile use and fuel demand. 
The high-demand scenario assumes that the VMT will grow as a linear extension 
of the past. Arguably, growth may be exponential in the future since increases in 
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income will make automobiles and automobile fuel more widely available. How- 
ever, congestion and the availability of public transportation may offset income- 
based growth. From 1975 to 1985, total highway mileage in the U.S. has remained 
essentially the same although the number of vehicles and total vehicle miles trav- 
elled have increased by 20% and 33%, respectively. 12 Over the same period, the 
number of passenger t ansit systems (e.g., buses, rail systems, trolleys) has more 
than doubled, and the number of passengers has increased by 30%. 13 Assuming 
that congestion remains and the expanded use of public transit continues, a high- 
demand scenario can probably assume no more than finear growth in VMT from 
past trends. 
The low-demand scenario assumes that reductions in VMT growth will slow 
such that VMT growth is reduced to zero by 2010. This scenario is a possible result 
of efforts to decrease automobile use. Concern over energy security and the en- 
vironmental side-effects of automobile use may generate pressure for such VMT 
reductions. As discussed later, the market restrictions in this low-demand scenario 
might be coupled with strong incentives uch as higher fuel prices to improve effi- 
ciency; high fuel prices will also help limit VMT. 
The reference scenario incorporates constraints from both the high- and low- 
demand scenarios and assumes that the average ,use of passenger cars will not 
increase much beyond current levels of 5271 VMT per person (8434 km per 
person)34 The underlying assumption is that for a very affluent society the con- 
straint on automobiIe use  is not economic growtk. Instead, there may be physical 
limits to high VMT growth: at current vehicle utilization of 1.7 persons/vehicle, 15 
the passenger miles travelled (PMT) per person is about 8960 mi (14336 km). In 
1985, 66% of the population held driver's licenses; 1(' on average, each driver would 
have to operate a vehicle 7990 mi (12784 kin) to achieve total VMT levels. Per- 
haps only as little as 60% of the population (144 million) is physically fit to drive an 
automobile legally, 17 in which case each driver would have to drive 8790 mi 
(14064 km). Thus if the average time budget allocated to personal travel does not 
change much in the future, population might be the growth-limiting factor 
(especially if congestion favors non-highway modes of travel). 
Based on this analysis, the reference scenario assumes that annual VMT growth 
will gradually reduce from the current average of 2.07%/yr 18 such that by 2000, 
VMT growth follows population growth. Note that passenger miles travelled 
(PMT) per capita might continue to increase under this scenario; indeed, the pres- 
sures of congestion and a greater interest in public transportation might favor 
higher utilization than 1.7 persons per vehicle. 
Figure 2 shows the VMT projections from the three scenarios. Figure 3 com- 
bines the data into projections for VMT per capita and VMT per potential driver, 
assuming that the percentage of potential drivers remains about 66% of the U.S. 
population. Note the steady decline in VMT per capita for the low-demand sce- 
nario: although VMT growth is zero, population continues to grow (except after 
2025 when U.S. population isprojected to decline .6%/yr). 19 
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1.2. Market Penetration 
Other authors have observed that technologies compete with each other for market 
share in a manner similar to niche competition between species. 2~ A new technol- 
ogy enters the market with a small share and progressively invades the market 
following a simple S-shaped logistic urve. 2~ It is assumed that NGVs will penetrate 
the automobile market in a similar manner. 
Since a program of NGV switching would require massive capital expenditures 
in refueling-equipment, natural gas pipelines, and mechanic training, it is not clear 
what the maximum arket penetration might be. Substitution between NGVs and 
conventional cars would likely be quite easy once the infrastructure is in place, so a 
continuous range of penetrations is possible. 
In an effort to bracket all these possibilities, two market-penetration scenarios 
are used: one with maximum penetration of 20%, the other with 60%. Market 
penetration is expressed as the portion of VMT driven by NGVs. The 20% sce- 
nario represents he likely penetration if just business and government fleet vehicles 
plus a limited number of other automobile users switch to NGVs. The most p01- 
luted cities might, for example, institute measures that make NGVs very attractive 
since NGVs have lower emissions of CO and non-methane hydrocarbons, both of 
which are controlled under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards? 2 
The 60% scenario reflects a likely result from a broader NGV switching pro- 
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Fig. 4. Hypothetical curves for diffusion of,NGVs into the U.S. automobile market. Vertical axis is the 
fraction of U.S. VMT driven by NGVs. Two scenarios - 20% and 60% diffusion - are used; a curve for 
100% diffusion (i.e., diffusion into that portion of VMT that is susceptible to NGV diffusion) is also 
shown. 
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gram. For example, national incentives might exist that favor NGV use for environ- 
mental reasons (perhaps even in response to the greenhouse effect). Nonetheless, 
intercity and rural automobile transport will probably remain reliant upon gasoline; 
for this reason, a somewhat arbitrary upper limit of 60% penetration is set. How- 
ever, higher penetration limits may result if natural gas refueling stations become 
widespread, prices for natural gas remain competitive with gasoline, and con- 
sumers do not believe NGVs will become obsolete. Also, if natural gas is widely 
used in other areas (e.g., electricity generation and heating) then the large supply 
network may assist high market penetration of NGVs by providing some of the 
pipeline infrastructure r quired for refueling stations. 
Figure 4 summarizes the changing market shares for the 20% and 60% sce- 
narios. The most rapid period of diffusion (from 10% potential market share to 
90%) is expected to take 20 years (At= 20 yr); complete diffusion (from 1% to 
99%) takes twice that time, or 40 years. This is less rapid than for other technologi- 
cal shifts: catalytic onverters diffused into the U.S. market with At= 13 yr, 23 and 
data on the survival rate of passenger vehicles upports a diffusion rate of about 
At= 10 yr. 24 However, changes in the refueling infrastructure aswell as necessary 
shifts in consumer behavior make a somewhat slower diffusion more likely. 
1.3. Efficiency 
Predicting future efficiencies i quite difficult since the future will, most likely, not 
follow past trends. Since 1973, improvements in automobile fficiency have been 
dramatic, and if the addition of energy-intensive pollution-control equipment is
controlled for, the results have been even more impressive. These improvements 
are the result of consumer demands for more efficient cars after the 1973 oil shock, 
but the U.S. policy of setting minimum efficiencies for new cars has also con- 
tributed. It is not clear how any of these variables will fluctuate in the future. 
Furthermore, other factors uch as consumer tastes and levels of vehicle ownership 
are also important for long-term projections ince they affect he character of the 
fleet which, in turn, affects overall efficiency. 
For the high-demand scenario, average fleet efficiency is assumed to grow at 
current levels through 1995 as the least efficient, older cars are retired from the 
fleet. Thereafter, efficiency growth decreases to zero and after 2000 there are no 
improvements in efficiency (i.e., efficiency remains at the 2000 level of 27 mi gal-l, 
MPG, or 11.4 km 1-1 or 8.7 1/100 km-1). This scenario posits that energy will 
remain relatively cheap and incentives to improve efficiency will be nonexistent. 
This is consistent with the other high-demand assumptions of unbounded 
automobile and fuel use. 
The low-demand scenario assumes that restrictions on market growth will be 
accompanied by strong incentives to improve fficiency. By 2050 the average fleet 
efficiency is assumed to increase to 60 MPG (26 km 1-1, or 3.9 1/100 km-l). This 
growth is less rapid than for the period 1975-1985, but it is assumed that the most 
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dramatic efficiency improvements such as the reduction in the sales of very large 
cars have already happened. 25 Nonetheless, the low-demand efficiency assump- 
tions require substantial improvements in all automobile systems and probably also 
require shifts in consumer tastes to favor smaller, lighter cars. However, the sce- 
nario is not entirely unrealistic since vehicles that perform at 50 MPG (21 km 1-1, 
or 4.7 1/100 km -1) are available today; presumably higher efficiencies will result 
from 60 years of future innovation, provided that proper incentives exist. Notably, 
achieving these country-wide fficiencies will probably require much higher fuel 
prices. 
The reference scenario assumes that pressure to improve fficiency will continue 
through 2050 but that the improvements will be less dramatic than for the low- 
demand scenario. By 2050, fleet efficiency is 45 MPG (19 km 1 ~, or 5.2 1/100 
km-J). As assumed with the other scenarios, the overall fleet efficiency will con- 
tinue to increase along the average trends for the period 1975-1985 as the major 
post-shock efficiency improvements filter through the fleet. After 1995, efficiency 
is assumed to increase by l%/yr, or about half the efficiency growth rate for 1975- 
1985. 
A major challenge to the reference scenario's efficiency assumption is the recent 
trend that the efficiency of new cars sold is decreasing after two years of stagna- 
tion. 2~' However, over the long run, such cyclic behavior is expected. 
An earlier version of this model attempted to study fuel consumption i more 
detail by focusing on the efficiency and sales of new cars; based on survival and 
utilization rates, total VMT and fuel use were, theoretically, calculated. 2v However, 
the attempt failed to make realistic long-term projections because the dynamics of 
survival and scrappage rates are not well understood; the number of free param- 
eters is unmanageable. 2s For this reason, the current model explicitly avoids the 
question of how many cars will be on the road and focuses only on VMT and fleet 
average fficiency. However, the per capita ownership of cars will probably increase 
from 1985 levels of 561 cars per 1000 to about 700 cars per 1000.  29 In 1985, 
Connecticut had an average ownership level of 745 automobiles per 1000 popula- 
tion, so even higher levels of vehicle ownership are not impossible. Survival rates 
may decrease with affluence; if so, the fleet will be newer and (perhaps) more 
efficient than the projections here. This should be kept in mind when analyzing the 
results. 
Efficiency of natural gas vehicles is highly dependent upon their basic design. 
For a dual-use vehicle (i.e. runs on both gasoline and natural gas) there may be no 
gain in fuel efficiency (e.g., km per joule of energy) over a purely conventional fuel 
vehicle. 3~ However, this analysis assumes that a vehicle optimally designed for com- 
pressed natural gas (CNG) will ultimately be 15% more efficient han a gasoline- 
fueled vehicle for two reasons: (1) natural gas has a higher octane number so it can 
burn more efficiently; 3] and (2) NGVs may ultimately require less pollution-control 
equipment, at least for CO emissions, ince natural gas has a lower carbon content 
than conventional fuels. This assumes that NO x emissions and NO X-control equip- 
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ment will be about the same as for conventional-fueled vehicles, but even this is not 
clear since the NOx/CO tradeoff may favor less NOx-control equipment for 
NGVs.  32 It is possible to imagine an ideal NGV which might have higher efficiency 
than the case used here, but with current NGVs this is probably the most reason- 
able case. However, the NGV fleet may initially be much more fuel efficient than 
the conventional gasoline-powered fleet because the NGVs will be new (assuming 
they are dedicated NGVs and not converted, existing gasoline automobiles). If this 
is the case, the model will overestimate fuel consumption by a progressively de- 
creasing percentage during the early (10-15 years) period of NGV use. 
If liquified natural gas vehicles (LNGVs) become popular instead of compressed 
natural gas, the overall efficiency will likely be 5% to 10% lower than for NGVs due 
to the energy required for fuel liquefaction. The exact efficiency loss depends on 
the design tradeoff between fuel pressure and temperature in the LNGV storage 
tanks. 
The efficiency of conventional gasoline-powered vehicles and NGVs is sum- 
marized in Figure 5. Note that in the past, efficiency has not always increased, so 
even the high-demand assumption that efficiency will remain level is suspect, 
especially if real energy prices decline as they did up to the oil shock of 1973. Also 
note the vigorous improvements in efficiency since 1973. 
As mentioned before, most of the greenhouse advantages of NGVs come from 
the lower CO2 emissions per unit of energy. This advantage for natural gas is in 
addition to the greater energy efficiency just discussed. 
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1.4. Pipeline Operations and Refining 
The combination of market growth, NGV penetration, and efficiency lead to total 
fuel consumption by fuel type. Before calculating greenhouse-gas emissions, the 
model also includes energy requirements (and, thus, CO2 emissions) for refining 
and 'own use' for fossil-fuel recovery, pipefine operations, other transport require- 
ments, and refining. For gasoline production, it is assumed that 8% of each ton of 
oil is burned in refining and in oil-recovery operations, releasing CO2. 33 An addi- 
tional 2% is consumed in pipeline and non-pipeline transport of oil products. For 
natural gas, about 9% of total gas consumption is for 'own-use', according to EIA 
(Energy Information Administration) statistics. 34 OECD data support a lower 
number, 5.5%, so this model, which uses the EIA data, may slightly overestimate 
CO2 emissions from NGVs if the OECD data are closer to the truth. 35 In general, 
'own use' energy requirements are assumed to be similar for petroleum and natural 
gas operations (i.e., on the order of 10%). 36 
'CO 2 emissions from industrial activity required to build the automobiles them- 
selves are not included. This omission probably exists systematically for NGVs and 
gasoline passenger cars so it will not affect the comparisons. 
1.5. Results 
Figure 6 summarizes the total energy use for the permutations of three growth sce- 
narios (high and low demand and the reference case) and three penetration sce- 
narios (0%, 20%, and 60% VMT by NGVs). Note that in the recent past, energy 
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consumption has been decreasing although VMT has, on average, been increasing 
(Figure 2). Since 1975, efficiency has grown much faster than VMT; both the 
reference and low-demand scenarios assume that this trend will continue in the 
future. For the high-demand scenario, VMT will grow much faster than efficiency, 
but due to the major efficiency improvements ince 1975, total fuel use in 2050 is 
only 50% higher than 1975 levels whereas VMT has increased 60% over the same 
period. Thus even if efficiency does not improve over the next century, the oil shock 
will continue to influence fuel consumption patterns by raising the average econo- 
my of the fleet to a new plateau (assuming it does not decline again). 
CO~_ emissions are calculated from total energy consumption using the CO2 
emission factors for gasoline and natural gas; ~ an amount equivalent o 50% of 
fossil-fuel emissions is assumed retained in the atmosphere for the period of the 
projections (i.e., until at least 2050). This has been called the 'marginal airborne 
fraction'. The value of 50% is taken from Bolin, whose estimate of the marginal air- 
borne fraction is based on a review of the carbon-cycle literature. 57 Many other 
energy projections have also used a value around 50%, so the projected CO 2 con- 
centrations presented here are compatible with past work in this area. 35 Because 
the projections here are relatively short (60 years) compared with the mean resi- 
dence time of atmospheric CO 2 - estimated at 23039 or 50040 years - no long-term 
'seepage' factor is used to account for the slow absorption of CO 2 into the deep" 
oceans. 41 The marginal airborne fraction is held constant at 50% with the assump- 
tion that the seepage is built in (this is the same method used by Bolin in projecting 
atmospheric CO 2 to the year 2100, much further than the current study). 
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TABLE I: Major greenhouse-related uncertainties that affect his model 
Parameter Range Notes 
Carbon dioxide: 
Atmospheric retention of anthropo- 
genic CO2 emissions ('marginal air- 
borne fraction') 
Methane: 
Mean residence time of CH 4 in the 
atmosphere 
Feedback factor for OH depletion 
Feedback factor for chemical/ 
radiative feedback 
Methane factor (for converting ppm 
CH 4 to equiv, of ppm C02) 
Methane sources: 
Total methane source 
% from 'old' sources (determined 
isotopically) 
Amount of fossil-fuel-derived CH 4 
is from natural sources (i.e., not 
directly related to mining or total 
energy production) 
All 'old' methane leaks due to 
energy production (coal + oil + nat. 
gas) 
Methane from coal mining 
30-70% 
(50% used here) 
8-14 years 
1-1.5 
1-2 
26 
400-640 Tg 
annually 
10-32% 
50-95 Tg 
annually 
25-45 Tg 
annually 
May change in the future if net 
sinks do not change in proport, to 
net CO 2 emissions. May be much 
lower if current CO2 source from 
deforestation is very large. 
May increase due to OH feedback. 
Such a feedback is estim, and in- 
cluded in model 
Amplifies effective missions of 
CH 4. 
Includes radiative ffects of trop. 
03 and stratospheric water vapor. 
Amplifies the methane factor 
described below. 
Uncertainty is quite small. May be 
smaller in the future due to band 
saturation. Is amplified by the 
chemical/radiative fe dbacks 
described above. 
540 Tg/yr used in this study (500 
TG/yr is quasi stdy. state source; 
40 Tg/yr yields the 1% annual incr. 
in atm. CH 4. 
22% for this study, including 33 Tg 
from 'old' biol. sources. 
33 Tg of 'old' sources assumed 
from biology in this study. The rest 
assumed proportional to respective 
energy production. Biol. sources or 
natural fossil based seeps may be 
larger, so problem of CH 4 leaks 
from energy prod. may be over- 
stated. 
May be lower if other methane 
sources release substantial quan. of 
'old' methane. 
Currently believed to be about 
35 Tg. 
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Table I (continued) 
Parameter Range Notes 
Methane from natural gas and oil 25-50 Tg 
annually 
Leakage rate 1-5% 
annually 
Amount of methane from natural 9 
gas/oil is from oil 
Currently believed to be about 
45 Tg. 
Calculated at 3.6% from atm. data; 
industry data support lower rate. 
This study uses 0 Tg, but the 
model is tested at 10.6 Tg and the 
results remain about he same. 
There is considerable uncertainty here since the net sources and net sinks of 
atmospheric CO 2 are not well understood. Further, the marginal airborne fraction 
is scenario dependent since changes in atmospheric CO 2 affect chemical buffering 
in the oeans and, thus, the fraction of emissions that remain airborne. For example, 
if total CO 2 emissions decrease, the marginal airborne fraction will decrease as 
well. 42 
Figure 7 summarizes the increase in greenhouse forcing since 1950.  43 CO 2 is 
expressed as the increase in parts per million (ppm) atmospheric CO 2 concentra- 
tion since 1950 attributable to automobile use in the U.S. The atmospheric content 
of CO 2 - because it is a cumulation of many years' emissions - responds luggishly 
to changes in the pattern of CO 2 emissions. The curve rises exponentially from 
1950 to 1975 as VMT grew rapidly while efficiency gradually decreased. Since 
1975, CO 2 concentrations from the U.S. automobile sector have grown linearly. 
Note that by 1988, atmospheric CO 2 concentrations had increased about 1.5 ppm 
since 1950 due to automobile use in the U.S. alone; the total increase (due to all 
CO2 emissions worldwide, including deforestation) over that period was about 
35 ppm. 
According to these calculations, NGVs can make only a small difference in CO2 
concentrations. Compared with zero NGV penetration, projected increases in 
atmospheric CO2 due to passenger vehicles in the U.S. are 4%, 5%, and 10% lower 
for 60% penetration in the low-demand, reference, and high-demand scenarios, 
respectively. Over time, the savings increase. NGVs are slightly more efficient han 
conventional gasoline-powered vehicles o they require less energy (Figure 6), but 
the lower CO2 emission factor for natural gas yields the largest savings. Nonethe- 
less, the combination of the two can yield only modest changes in atmospheric 
CO 2. 
The most dramatic differences in atmospheric CO 2 come from different fuel- 
consumption patterns, not NGV switching. Atmospheric CO 2 from the high- 
demand scenario is nearly 70% higher than the low-demand scenario and 60% 
higher than the reference scenario. This paper does not address the economics of 
fuel switching under these three scenarios, but it appears that market constraints 
coupled with efficiency improvements may offer larger opportunities for green- 
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house-gas reductions than do NGVs themselves. Nonetheless, a program of NGV 
switching may help reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, and other benefits in lower 
urban pollution may favor NGVs as well. 
2. The Problem of Methane Leakage 
q'he results are less favorable for NGVs if the effects of leaking methane are in- 
cluded, since only small emissions of methane can have a large effect on total 
greenhouse h at rapping. On a molecular basis, the direct greenhouse forcing from 
methane is about 26 times that of CO2 .44 Methane missions may also yield feed- 
backs due to altered tropospheric chemistry or stratospheric, water vapor, which 
could enhance the direct greenhouse forcing of methane and the abundance of 
methane in the atmosphere. (Direct emissions of N20 are not considered in this 
study because they are no longer considered significant. 45) 
This section will expand the model to include methane l aks. The discussion is
divided into five sub-sections: (1) presentation of the model used to calculate the 
atmospheric concentration f methane which is the result of past years' emissions; 
(2) estimation of possible current and future natural gas leaks; (3) discussion of the 
character and magnitude of various feedbacks that may enhance the direct effects 
of methane emissions; and (4) presentation f results. 
A fifth sub-section on the role of methane l aks from the oil production is also 
included at the end. This source of methane isnon-trivial and presents complicated 
accounting problems ince some natural gas production is associated with oil pro- 
duction and it appears that leaks from such associated production are relatively 
large. 
As discussed throughout this section, anumber of variables are highly uncertain; 
these uncertainties are reviewed in Table I. Two main uncertainties - the leak rate 
and the strength of various feedbacks - are explored through the use of three 
scenarios. One scenario will represent the best case for NGVs, one will represent 
the worst case, and a third intermediate scenario is derived with values between the 
other, extreme cases. 
2.1. Computing the Greenhouse Forcing of Atmospheric Methane 
Any discussion which compares relative greenhouse forcing of CO 2 and CH 4 (as 
this one does) must account for the different atmospheric dynamics of the two 
gases. This will allow computation of the average annual atmospheric concentra- 
tions (as distinct from emissions) of the CO2 and CH 4 due to past emissions of 
these gases. The gases are then compared on the basis of concentration using the 
26 : 1 ratio. 
As discussed earlier, atmospheric CO2 is modelled using the airborne fraction 
method. A first-order attempt at including the atmospheric chemistry of atmos- 
pheric methane is made by assuming a well-mixed atmosphere and by simplifying 
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methane l aks to a single emission each year. After release to the atmosphere, emis- 
sions from any year t o are removed through reaction with OH radicals in the 
troposphere: 
CH 4 + OH ---~ CH s + H20 (1) 
The shape of the curve is exponential, and the rate of removal is reflected in the 
mean residence time of methane in the atmosphere (10 years46). At time tl0, 1/e (or 
37%) of the amount emitted at time t 0 will remain in the atmosphere. At any year, t, 
the atmospheric concentration f methane is the sum of the methane remaining in 
the atmosphere (i.e. not reacted) from emissions in the years t, L j, L2, t_3, etc. Upon 
reaction, the methane isassumed oxidized to CO 2 and is treated as a CO2emission. 
The model described here computes the.atmospheric retention of CO2 and CH 4 
quite differently. An amount equivalent to 50% of each year's CO2 emissions is 
assumed to accumulate in the atmosphere. For methane, there is no inherefit 
accumulation since a decay function is built into the model. It would be possible to 
derive a curve for CO 2 that is similar to the one just described for methane. How- 
ever, there is considerable uncertainty in estimating the mean residence time of 
CO 2 in the atmosphere; also, any single 'residence time' for CO 2 would be mis- 
leading. 47 
The intention here is simply to show and compare the greenhouse curves into 
the near future (60 years from now). This is why the greenhouse is shown dynami- 
cally on graphs rather than as a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation that might 
integrate all future global war~ning from current emissions into a single index. The 
advantage of the airborne fraction method is that it seems to accurately describe 
the current balance between sources and sinks of CO 2 and, thus, the observed rise 
in atmospheric CO 2 concentrations. The disadvantage is that by stopping the 
graphs in 2050, the analysis here inherently ignores future warming from long-lived 
gases (i.e., CO2). Other authors have chosen to model CO 2 with a decay function 
using a variety of atmospheric lifetimes; 48 comparisons of different studies hould 
recognize the importance ofthese methodological differences. 
2.2. Methane Leak Rates 
Estimating the current leak rate is quite difficult and highly contentious. Essentially 
two methods are available for computing leak rates. One way is to start with iso- 
topic and other data on the global sources of atmospheric methane and work back- 
wards to yield an estimate for worldwide leak rates. For this exercise, the methane 
budget of Cicerone and Oremland 49 is adopted. Globally averaged for the period 
1978-1987, methane concentrations were 1680 ppb (parts per billion) and were 
increasing by about 16 ppb/yr. 5~ The estimated annual methane source is 540 Tg 
(540 • 1012 g), of which it is assumed that about 22% (119 Tg) is 'dead' as deter- 
mined by isotopic analysis; however, some measurements suggest the sources of 
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such 'old' methane may be much larger. 51 Of the 119 Tg, the Cicerone and Orem- 
land budget assigns 33 Tg and 5 Tg to natural wetlands and methane hydrates, 
respectively. The remaining = 80 Tg is assumed from fossil-fuel recovery: 35 Tg are 
assumed from coal-mining activity and the rest (45 Tg) from natural gas drilling, 
transmission, and venting. Based on 1985 worldwide natural gas use of 1.71 x 
1012 m 3 (1230 Tg), 52 the average leakage rate is computed at about 3.6%. As out- 
lined in Table I, there are many uncertainties. For example, it is not clear how to 
apportion the 'dead' carbon among the various potential sources. Furthermore, the 
45 Tg attributed to natural gas leaks may not be entirely proportional to natural gas 
production since some sources may be leakier than others. All of these uncertain- 
ties affect he calculations, especially the average leak rate assigned to worldwide 
natural gas activities. 
The other method is to estimate l ak rates by direct measurement of gas fluxes 
from wellheads, pipelines, distribution systems, and end users. However, the poten- 
tial sources of such leaks are highly dispersed and thus difficult o measure accu- 
rately. As part of a California rate filing, Pacific Gas and Electric found that leaks 
from its gas distribution pipelines were substantially below 1% and implied that 
leak rates would decrease in the future. 53 Arthur D. Little, in a 1989 study for 
Ruhrgas A.G., found that the leak rate for all gaseous hydrocarbon emissions was 
about 1%; the methane l ak rate was estimated at 0.53% of world natural gas pro- 
duction. 54 The American Gas Association has estimated methane releases to the 
atmosphere at 1.25% of U.S. production. 55OECD statistics uggest that 'unac- 
counted for' gas is 2.9% of production; EIA data for 'unaccounted for' (UAF) gas 
are higher, about 4%. 56 However, it is not clear what fraction of UAF gas is actually 
released to the atmosphere and what is due to measurement, accounting, or other 
errors. 57 
In sum, there is considerable disagreement on the issue of leak rates. Some of 
the difference between the two methods may be due to sampling. In situ data only 
exist for some of Western Europe and North America, so other large gas producers 
for which there is little or no reliable data (especially the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe) may have high leak rates which offset low leak producers. If this is the 
case, globally averaged leak rates would be higher than suggested by U.S. and West 
European data. Still, if Western leaks are ~ 1% then leaks from other areas would 
have to be much higher (e.g., 10% or even higher) than in the West if the 3.6% 
figure derived from atmospheric data is correct. Alternatively, leak rates may 
simply be higher than reported by the Western gas industry. This is because there is 
very little data on end-user leaks, which may be large; similarly, there is little data 
on leaks from low-pressure end-distribution systems. In any case, all the data have 
considerable uncertainties that may account for much of the inconsistency. More 
work on this problem is currently underway9 
A best-case scenario for NGVs assumes that leak rates are about 1%; this is 
based on the assumption that natural gas recovery, pipeline, and distribution leaks 
are low and that NGV-related leaks will be low. A worst-case scenario uses leak 
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rates of 5% on the assumption that current leak rates are much higher than esti- 
mated by the gas industry; perhaps they are even higher than estimated through the 
atmospheric data. Further, there may be considerable aking from NGV refueling 
and the NGVs themselves. Automobile accidents, poor maintenance, tailpipe 
methane emissions, and tank purges will all increase atmospheric release of 
methane and thus contribute to the leak rate. These NGV-related leaks may be 
large, in addition to large wellhead and pipeline leaks. 
An intermediate scenario uses a leak rate of 2.5%, somewhere between the gas- 
industry estimates, which cluster near 1%, and the atmospheric data, which suggest 
leak rates over 3%. 
2.3. Feedbacks 
In addition to direct effects on climate, emissions of methane will also have indirect 
effects on climate and atmospheric chemistry that will positively feed back on the 
initial climatic effects. Primarily, there are three feedbacks. First, since methane 
reacts with and depletes OH (required for reaction 1), methane missions extend 
the lifetime of methane in the atmosphere and lead to further increases in methane 
concentration. Second, the oxidation of methane also increases tropospheric ozone 
concentrations, which increases greenhouse forcing since ozone is a greenhouse 
gas. Third, methane contributes to stratospheric water vapor and increases green- 
house forcing since water vapor is also a greenhouse gas. The first feedback will be 
called the OH-feedback; the last two, together, will be called the radiative feed- 
backs. 
There is considerable uncertainty regarding the strengths of these feedbacks. 
Estimates of the OH feedback and tropospheric ozone feedback are based on 
atmospheric models, but those models show that there is a complex relationship 
between a variety Of tropospheric gases; the spatialdistribution f various gases is a 
very important factor that affects tropospheric chemistry and the strength of the 
feedback. 59 For example, tropospheric ozone formation is related to the spatial dis- 
tribution of methane, other hydrocarbons, CO, and NO• emissions. 6~ The NO X- 
dependence of ozone formation also heavily affects the strength of the OH feed- 
back because ozone can itself react to produce OH, offsetting some or all of the 
OH-feedback. 61 Thus the tropospheric 0 3 feedback and the OH-feedback are NO x 
dependent, and, to some extent, these feedbacks are inversely related: high tropo- 
spheric ozone formation offsets OH depletion. Further, the strength of radiative 
forcing - and thus the strength of the radiative feedback - depends on the altitudi- 
nal distribution of the radiatively active gases. 
In a review of these and other feedbacks, Lashof has estimated that the OH 
feedback from methane missions has the effect of adding an extra 0.5 moles of 
atmospheric methane for every 1 mole emitted (i.e. OH feedback factor of 1.5). He 
has also estimated that the direct radiative forcing of methane is increased 70% by 
indirect effects of increased tropospheric ozone and stratospheric water vapor 
forcing (i.e., radiative feedback factor of 1.7). 62 
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Given the uncertainties, the best-case scenario will assume that the feedbacks 
are overestimated and that the feedback factors are 1 (i.e., there are no feedbacks). 
Even as a best case this may be excessive since it seems that some level of such 
feedbacks will exist. However, this scenario is not entirely unreasonable: it is 
generally assumed that replacing gasoline-powered vehicles with NGVs will im- 
prove urban air quality (including lower urban ozone) and thus some of the 
methane feedbacks may be offset by the greenhouse advantages of lower urban 
ozone. 
For the worst-case scenario, the feedback factors of Lashof are used, but the 
radiative feedback factor is increased to 2 on the assumption that current models 
under-predict the increase in tropospheric ozone due to increased methane con- 
centrations. It is possible that the radiative feedback factor may even be higher. 
Owens et al. have estimated the feedback from tropospheric ozone, alone, at 1.7. 63 
For this scenario, the OH feedback factor remains at 1.5. If the radiative feedbacks 
are strong - especially the tropospheric ozone feedback - then it is difficult to 
imagine that the OH feedback factor will be very large since, as mentioned before, 
high ozone concentrations will probably offset at least some OH depletion. 
Finally, for the intermediate scenario it is assumed that the OH feedback factor 
remains as described by Lashof but that the radiative feedback factor is lower, 
about 1.3, because some of the feedbacks are offset by improved air quality and, 
generally, tropospheric ozone formation will be lo,wer than predicted by the radia- 
tive chemical models used "to deduce the higher adiative feedback factors. 
The various leak rates and feedback factors used in the three scenarios are sum- 
marized in Table II. 
TABLE II: Summary of leak scenarios 
Scenarios and parameters Value 
Best-case scenario 
Natural gas leak rate 1% 
Trop. 03 and strat, water-vapor feedback 1 
OH-feedback 1 
Worst-case scenario 
Natural gas leak rate 5% 
Trop. 0 3 and strat, water-vapor feedback 2 
OH-feedback 1.5 
Intermediate-case sc nario 
Natural gas leak rate 2.5% 
Trop. 03 and strat, water-vapor feedback 1.3 
OH-feedback 1.5 
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2.4. Results 
Figure 8 shows the effects of leaking methane applied to the reference scenario 
with 60% NGV penetration. Five curves are shown: best case, worst case, inter- 
mediate case, and, for comparison, there is also a curve for the case if no NGVs are 
used and a curve if 60% NGVs are used but the leak rate is 0%. For better resolu- 
tion, the period 2030-2050 is enlarged and shown in Figure 9. The results are also 
reported in Table III, which also shows the percentage of greenhouse forcing due to 
methane for each scenario. 
As before, when methane was not considered, the curves diverge over time; also, 
the curves respond sluggishly, primarily because the CO 2 emissions are cumulated 
over time. By 2050, the increase in greenhouse forcing since 1950 under the worst- 
case scenario is 17% higher (4.02 ppm equiv.) than under the no NGVs scenario 
(3.44 ppm equiv.). The best-case scenario is 4% lower (3.30 ppm equiv.) than the 
no NGVs scenario. The intermediate scenario - using moderate leak rates and 
moderate feedback factors - is slightly higher (3.50 ppm equiv.) than if no NGVs 
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Fig. 8. Increase in atmospheric concentration f greenhouse gases (CO 2 and CH4) since 1950 due to 
automobile use in the United States using the reference scenario with 60% NGV penetration. Concen- 
trations expressed in CO 2 equivalents, which is the sum of the increase in CO 2 concentration since 
1950 and the atmospheric methane concentration due to fossil-fuel use. Atmospheric methane con- 
centrations are computed by the methane model described in the text and multiplied by 26 to convert 
ppm CH 4 into ppm CO2. The methane concentrations are further multiplied by a chemical feedback 
factor (methane missions are multiplied by an OH-feedback factor). As described in the text, three 
scenarios are used to account for different leak rates and different feedback factors (scenarios sum- 
marized in Table II). These results also reported in Table III, along with the percentage greenhouse 
forcing due to methane. 
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TABLE III: Total greenhouse forcing (in ppm CO 2 equiv.) and percentage contribution of methane 
Scenario 2000 2025 2050 
Total % CH 4 Total % CH 4 Total % CH4 
No NGVs 1.99 0.0% 2.79 0.0% 3.44 0.0% 
0% leak 1.99 0.0% 2,75 0.0% 3.25 0.0% 
Intermed. case 1.99 0.0% 2.87 4.3% 3.50 6.7% 
Worst case 1.99 0.1% 3.15 12.6% 4.02 18.7% 
Best case 1.99 0,0% 2.77 0.9% 3.30 1.4% 
were used. This suggests that greenhouse forcing may increase if NGVs replace 
gasoline-powered vehicles. However, the range of outcomes is considerably nar- 
rower than under different demand assumptions (compare Figure 8 with Figure 7). 
All of the low-demand scenarios yield lower greenhouse forcing, and all of the 
high-demand scenarios yield substantially higher greenhouse forcing. 
The curves and the results in Table III imply greater precision than actually 
exists since the uncertainties are extremely large. Fundamentally, there are major 
uncertainties in the leak rate, the feedback factors, and the method used for model- 
ling atmospheric CO 2. A large change in any one of these factors can significantly 
affect the relative greenhouse merits of NGVs a~d'gasoline-powered vehicles. 
Nonetheless, the general conclusion remains. It is possible that greenhouse forcing 
into the middle of the next century may not decrease despite a vigorous NGV 
switching campaign. Forcing may even increase, and if the worst-case scenario is 
realized it may increase substantially. 
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Fig. 9. Same as Fig. 8 but with better resolution for the period 2030-2050, 
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2.5. Oil Production and Associated Gas Leaks 
There is a difficult accounting problem in assigning natural gas leaks to various 
sources. The 3.6% leak rate based on atmospheric data is derived from an estimate 
of the total worldwide natural gas leaks; world natural gas production is divided 
into that figure to get 3.6%. However, a considerable amount of natural gas is pro- 
duced in associated wells and should be attributed to oil production rather than 
natural gas production. Whether or not the natural gas byproducts from these wells 
are used, such oil operations yield substantial methane l aks. For North America, 
the Arthur D. Little study found that he production leaks of natural gas were about 
evenly divided between the oil industry and the gas industry. 64 Worldwide, about 
80% of the leaks were attributed to the oil-production i dustry. 65 
Presumably most of the natural gas leaks from the oil industry would be ac~ 
counted for in the Arthur D. Little study since it is expected that most of those 
leaks are in those areas they analyzed: (1) at or near the wellhead ue to vented or 
incompletely flared associated gas, and (2) from refineries. Thus this may be a 
reasonable estimate for total natural gas leaks that are attributable tooil consump- 
tion (i.e., from wellhead to the end user of oil products). However, it does not follow 
that this is an accurate stimate of total natural gas leaks attributed to gas consump- 
tion because, as argued before, large gas leaks may be from interstate pipelines, 
end-distribution systems, and end users, which are not covered in the Arthur D. 
Little report. This suggests hat, the bulk of the natural gas leaks are still attributable 
to the natural gas industry. However, this is a highly contentious point. 
Nonetheless, some attempt must be made to include leaks from oil operations. If 
the leaks from the oil industry are high, gasoline-powered vehicles would emit not 
only high levels of CO 2 but also significant levels of CH 4. This could work to the 
comparative advantage ofNGVs, even if the NGVs also leak methane. 
The Arthur D. Little study suggests he worldwide leaks of methane from oil and 
natural gas production are about 6.6 Yg; 66 of that, Arthur D. Little has attributed 
5.3 Tg to oil production. 67As just noted, this should be most of the leaks expected 
from oil production. However, perhaps the Arthur D. Little study has underesti- 
mated these leaks. Thus, in an effort to project a favorable case for NGVs, the 
5.3 Tg figure is doubled (10.6 Tg) to account for possibly unknown natural gas 
leaks which should be attributed to oil production. 
Even when doubled, the leak rates for the oil industry are not large when com- 
pared with the gas industry. In 1987, worldwide oil production was 123 x 10 TM j;68 
dividing that number into the 10.6 Tg of CH 4 yields an average leak rate of 
0.086 Tg per 10 TM J of oil production. For comparison, a 2% leak of annual natural 
gas production is 0.37 Tg per 10 TM J (about 4 times the oil leak rate). Thus" even 
when oil sources of natural gas leaks are included, the leak rates from the natural 
gas industry appear much larger. However, it is not clear what the real leak rates are 
from either industry, so conclusions here are still premature. Further, the range of 
uncertainty in budgets presented by Cicerone and Oremland 49 and others 69 is 
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Fig. 10. Same as Fig. 9 but methane l aks from oil production are also estimated. As described in the 
text, what may be an extreme case is considered here in order to give the greatest comparative advan- 
tage to NGVs over gasoline-powered vehicles. These results are also reported in Table IV, along with 
the percentage reenhouse forcing due to methane. 
sufficiently large that it is possible to construct a case where leakage from oil 
systems is high while leakage from gas production is extremely low (i.e., below 1%). 
Under those assumptions, fuel switching from oil-based fuels to natural gas would 
always yield lower global warming. 
Figure 10 reports the results for the five scenarios when this additional source of 
methane is included. The results are also summarized along with the percentage 
contribution of methane in Table I~. In general, all the curves are shifted slightly 
upward because of the additional forcing from additional methane leaks (compare 
with Figure 9 and Table III). However, the basic conclusions remain. The capacity 
TABLE IV: Total greenhouse forcing (in ppm CO2 equiv.) and percentage contribution of methane; 
includes methane l aks attributed to oil consumption 
Scenario a 2000 2025 2050 
Total % CH 4 Total % CH 4 Total % CH 4 
No NGVs 2.09 4.4% 2.87 2.5% 3.51 1.6% 
0% leak 2.09 4.4% 2.81 2.0% _ 3.29 0.8% 
Intermed. case 2.09 4.4% 2.94 6.1% 3.53 7.4% 
Worst case 2.13 6.7% 3.24 14.9% 4.07 19.4% 
Best case 2.06 3.4% 2.82 2.4% 3.33 2.0% 
" Intermediate feedback values used for the 'no NGVs' and '0% leak' scenarios. 
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to reduce greenhouse forcing in the near term through NGV switching is limited. 7~ 
Over the period of analysis considered here, the no-NGVs curve falls between 
the best case and the intermediate case; thus, the 'break-even' point is probably 
1.5-2%. However, as the CO2 benefits of using natural gas instead of oil-based 
fuels accumulate (i.e., as the period of analysis is extended), the case in favor of 
NGVs improves. This is reflected in the different shape of the 'no-NGVs' curve. 
These results are consistent with other studies. For electricity and combined heat 
production - where the efficiency advantages of natural gas over oil are even 
greater than those of NGVs over gasoline-powered automobiles - Wilson has com- 
puted a break-even point of 3-4% for near-term (greenhouse forcing integrated 
over 20 years) analyses. 71Longer-term analyses (i.e., over 100 years) yield a much 
higher break-even point (~ 22%). Rodhe has computed a break-even point of 
-~ 4% for long-term analyses, but that study did not consider the efficiency advan- 
tages of natural gas. 72 
3. Conclusions 
In terms of VMT and fuel consumption, the U.S. automobile market grew dramati- 
cally from 1950 to 1975. Since then, VMT has continued to grow while total fuel 
consumption (and greenhouse-gas emissions) have declined. If efficiency continues 
to improve into the future, fuel consumption will probably continue to decline 
(low-demand and reference scenarios). If efficiency stagnates and VMT continues 
to grow (high-demand scenario), primary fuel consumption will climb to nearly 4 
times 1950 levels (1.5 times 1975 levels). 
It is unlikely that the act of switching asoline-powered vehicles to compressed 
natural gas will yield lower greenhouse forcing. Indeed, it is argued here that in- 
cluding the leaks from the natural gas system and NGVs themselves may reverse 
the greenhouse benefits of NGVs. Regardless, changes in greenhouse forcing due 
to methane leakage are relatively small when compared with the high- and low- 
demand scenarios that show the greenhouse benefits of improving efficiency and 
constraining VMT growth. This is consistent with other studies that have shown the 
variety of promising options for dramatically increasing average efficiency in 
automobiles and reducing fuel consumption. 73 
This work suggests everal policy-related areas for further research. First, there 
should be close consideration of the obstacles to identifying sources of methane 
leaks and the implications of such obstacles for the feasibility of a comprehensive 
treaty to control global warming. A fleet of NGVs will further disperse the sources 
of methane leakage and will add to the complexity of verifying a treaty. 74 
Second, comparisons of greenhouse forcing due to CO 2 and non-CO 2 emissions 
are highly dependent upon a number of controversial assumptions, notably the 
atmospheric lifetime of CO 2. The computed break-even point for methane leakage 
can vary by a factor of two or more under different methodological ssumptions 
regarding atmospheric retention of CO 2. This must be kept in mind and will con- 
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tinue to be one of the fundamental uncertainties that affects greenhouse policy 
analysis. 
The method used here has assumed that the CO2 airborne fraction will remain 
constant. If the airborne fraction falls over time - which might be expected with 
these low demand scenarios (see ref. 42) - then the relative importance of leaking 
methane will rise. Additional studies in this area should compare the methods and 
parameters used to compute atmospheric concentrations and greenhouse forcing 
of the different gases. This is especially the case for CO2, whose complicated and 
uncertain response function is central to studies like the present one. 
Third, it would be useful to analyze greenhouse-gas emissions in the context of 
more realistic transportation models such as those of Zahavi 75 and Herman. 76 
Time budgets, money budgets, vehicle traffic quality, and other factors all con- 
tribute to consumer choices which, in turn, affect greenhouse-gas emissions and the 
cost-effectiveness of policy alternatives. 
Fourth, a similar direction of research would be to compare stimated costs of 
reducing leaks with estimates of the cost of improving automobile fuel economy. 77
The results presented here suggest that fuel economy improvements are probably 
much more cost-effective than would be efforts to tighten the natural gas supply 
and distribution system. However, extending this work to disaggregate he eco- 
nomic and social costs of efficiency improvements and VMT constraints may, in 
conjunction with the research described in the previous paragraph, provide impor- 
tant policy insights. 
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